The Trump administration has announced multiple new developments in U.S. tariff policy since our April update. The administration is using several different tools to implement tariffs, including § 232 and 301 investigations under the Trade Act of 1974 and executive orders issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Tariffs continue to be a favored tool of the administration to address a broad range of economic and national security concerns in an unprecedented manner. 

Key U.S. Tariff Developments

• The Department of Commerce initiated § 232 investigations on imports of commercial aircraft and jet engines and their parts, trucks, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and polysilicon and its derivatives. The Office of the U.S Trade Representative initiated a § 301 investigation of China’s practices targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. These investigations could result in additional tariffs related to these products in the coming months. 
• On July 1, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a § 301 investigation of Brazil for unfair practices, including related to digital trade and electronic payment services. Separately, a July 30, 2025, executive order imposed additional tariffs on certain products from Brazil for total tariffs up to 50%. 
• After the Commerce Department concluded its § 232 investigation, the president announced a 50% tariff, effective August 1, on semi‑finished copper products and intensive copper derivatives (e.g., pipes, wiring, components) listed in an Annex, while raw copper materials (like ores and cathodes) are exempt. The president also directed the Commerce Department to establish a process for including additional derivative copper articles within the scope of the duties. 
• A July 30, 2025, executive order eliminated the $800 de minimis threshold for duty-free, low-value shipments for imports from all countries. A prior executive order had eliminated de minimis treatment for imports from China, and the new executive order expands to all imports. There is a six-month period where imports through the international postal network will only be subject to a flat duty per item ($80, $160, or $200 per item depending on the country's tariff rate) before standard duties apply.
• On August 7, 2025, the previously announced “reciprocal” tariffs on all imports took effect, with the White House electing not to further delay implementation. Starting August 7, 2025, all imports are subject to a 10% universal reciprocal tariff as a floor, with most countries subject to additional country-specific tariffs. Notable aspects of the “reciprocal tariffs” include:
  • The Trump administration announced a 90-day delay in the proposed 145% tariffs on Chinese-origin goods. The “reciprocal” tariff rate for China remains at 30% while negotiations continue.
  • The increased tariff rates for Canada and Mexico do not apply to United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) goods.
  • Several countries negotiated trade deals to reduce the proposed reciprocal tariff, including the United Kingdom (10% flat rate), Vietnam (20% rate down from 46%), Japan (15%), South Korea (15%), and the European Union (15%), and other countries may conclude negotiations in the near term.
• An August 6, 2025, executive order announced that, effective August 2, 2025, there would be a 25% additional tariff on goods imported from India to address national security risks from India’s ongoing purchase of oil from Russia. This marks a unique use of tariffs, as opposed to traditional secondary sanctions, to discourage third-country dealings with U.S.-sanctioned parties or countries. The 25% tariff is stacked on top of other duties applicable to imports from India, such as the “reciprocal” tariffs, except for duties imposed under § 232.

The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration since January 2025 have most impacted sectors reliant on steel, aluminum, and other items targeted by prior § 232 actions. However, as the new tariffs described above come into effect this month, we anticipate the impact will be more widespread and that companies reliant on countries with high “reciprocal” tariff rates (Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh) or countries that have been specifically targeted (China, India, Brazil) will see the biggest impacts. While some exemptions apply, for example for USMCA goods, the exception processes that previously existed for § 301 and § 232 tariffs during the first Trump administration are no longer available.

The administration has made it clear that it will aggressively pursue importers for transshipment to evade tariffs. Importers should make sure to work closely with their customs brokers to understand the tariffs that apply to imported items, how the different tariffs aggregate, and whether exemptions apply.

Ongoing Legal Challenges

Notably, the Trump administration’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) as the authority to issue tariffs is subject to ongoing legal challenges. Below are key updates on the status of this litigation, which could result in the unwinding of some of the tariffs described above if the challenges are successful. 

• On May 28, 2025, the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) issued a ruling in V.O.S. Selections that vacated and enjoined imposition of tariffs levied under IEEPA throughout the prior months. These IEEPA tariffs include the tariffs on energy and goods from Canada (EO 14193), Mexico (EO 14194), and China (EO 14195) (and all modifying orders) issued to address illicit drug trafficking, and the tariffs on all goods from U.S. trading partners issued to address “persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits” (EO 14257 and all modifying orders). The CIT held that the tariffs in EOs 14193, 14194, and 14195 exceed the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA because they do not “deal with” the specific problem they were levied to address, and instead merely create “leverage” to do so. The CIT also held that the tariffs in EO 14257 exceed the scope of presidential authority because they were levied to address balance-of-payments deficits and are therefore subject to § 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, not IEEPA, and they do not meet the narrower § 122 requirements that set limits on the amount and duration of tariffs levied for balance-of-payment purposes.
• On June 10, 2025, in response to an appeal from the U.S. government, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entered a stay on the CIT’s ruling that allows the tariffs to remain in effect until the Federal Circuit decides the case on the merits. The Federal Circuit heard oral arguments on July 31, 2025, and has not yet issued a ruling. If the Federal Circuit upholds the CIT’s ruling, the U.S. government will likely request a similar stay from the United States Supreme Court allowing the tariffs to remain in effect until the Supreme Court decides the issue on the merits.
• Separately, on May 29, 2025, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (DDC) issued a preliminary injunction of the IEEPA tariffs for two small business plaintiffs. In Learning Resources, the DDC reached a different conclusion from the CIT and held that IEEPA does not provide the president with any tariff authority because “the [IEEPA] power to regulate is not the power to tax.” The government subsequently appealed the DDC injunction. On June 3, 2025, the DDC granted the government’s motion to stay the injunction until the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (CADC) rules on the merits of the appeal. The CADC will hear oral arguments on September 30, 2025. Moreover, on June 17, 2025, the U.S. government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court to rule on whether IEEPA authorizes tariffs. The Supreme Court has not yet approved or denied this petition.