On January 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an amendment to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that is designed to allow for increased exports of NVIDIA H200, AMD MI325X, and similar artificial intelligence chips to Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers located in China and Macau. These AI chips continue to require a license for export to China and Macau, but such license applications may now be reviewed by BIS under a “case-by-case” license review policy instead of the previous categorical presumption of denial for such destinations. Qualifying for case-by-case review requires that the exporter and recipient satisfy the rigorous requirements described below.
The January 15 rule follows the Trump administration’s previously announced AI Action Plan that seeks to balance U.S. foreign policy and national security interests with U.S. commercial interests in diffusing AI chips globally. The requirements for export licenses subject to the case-by-case review are novel in that the exporter must demonstrate that such shipments to China/Macau are not at the expense of potential U.S. customers. While the requirements are rigorous and transaction scope is narrow, this rule nonetheless opens the door for increased exports of AI chips to China and Macau.
Background
NVIDIA H200 chips and all other advanced AI chips that meet the performance criteria in Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 3A090.a are restricted for China, Macau, and other U.S. arms embargoed jurisdictions listed in Country Group D:5 in Supplement No. 1 to Part 740 of the EAR. Prior to the January 15 rule, all license applications for exports to Macau and China were reviewed under a presumption of denial, meaning that it was almost certain that a license application would be denied.
A license continues to be required to export ECCN 3A090.a items to China and Macau. However, the January 15 rule creates the opportunity for exporters to have such license applications reviewed under the lesser “case-by-case” review policy, improving the chances of BIS ultimately issuing the license.
What Qualifies for Case-by-Case Review?
- Items: NVIDIA H200, AMD MI325X, and other ECCN 3A090.a chips with a total processing power (TPP) less than 21,000 and a "total DRAM bandwidth" less than 6,500 GB/s
- Destinations: China and Macau
- Shipment type: Exports from the United States
- Parties to the transaction: Parties that are headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, a jurisdiction outside of Macau or Country Group D:5 (the EAR end user and end use restrictions in Part 744 continue to apply)
What Continues to be Reviewed Under a Presumption of Denial?
- Items: NVIDIA Blackwell and other ECCN 3A090.a AI chips that meet or exceed the TPP and total DRAM bandwidth described above
- Destinations: Other countries in Country Group D:5
- Shipment type: Re-exports from third countries (including exports of AI chips subject to the EAR from abroad) and transfers (in-country) within China or Macau
- Parties to the transaction: Parties that are headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Macau or Country Group D:5, including Macau/D:5-headquartered parties located in third countries or within China and Macau
How Do I Qualify for Case-by-Case Review?
The requirements to qualify for case-by-case review are rigorous both for the exporter and the recipient of the AI chips. If the requirements are not met, the transaction will be reviewed under the existing presumption of denial. While the exporter/license applicant is responsible for submitting the materials, demonstrating to BIS that the case-by-case review criteria are met will require close coordination with the recipient.
The applicant must prove the following criteria in a license application to qualify for case-by-case review:
- U.S. Supply Data: Sufficient supply of the AI chips at issue exists, such that the proposed shipment will not result in any delay in fulfilling orders of AI chips for U.S. customers, and that the aggregate shipments of such AI chips to China and Macau are no more than 50% of the aggregate TPP shipped to U.S. customers.
- IaaS Provider Recipient KYC: Any IaaS provider receiving the AI chips employs rigorous Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures to prevent restricted end users, such as Entity List entities, from remotely using the AI chips’ compute capacity.
- Third-Party Lab Testing: Each shipment is reviewed by a U.S.-based, independent, third-party testing lab to confirm the AI chips’ performance criteria.
- Country of Concern Remote End Users: Any IaaS provider’s list of intended remote end users located in, headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Belarus, China, Cuba, Iran, Macau, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.
- Restricted End Uses or End Users: The AI chips are not for a restricted end use or end user described in Part 744 of the EAR, including with respect to military and military-intelligence, and nuclear, missile, or chemical or biological weapons.
- Additional End Use Restrictions: Verify that the recipient and any IaaS end user will not transfer model weights trained on the products to end users not previously disclosed to BIS, and will not directly or indirectly provide prohibited end users with remote access to an algorithm trained on the products.
- IaaS Provider Physical Security: Any IaaS provider has physical security measures in place where the AI chips will be located.
U.S. export controls on AI chips and other advanced computing items continue to evolve. The January 15 rule indicates that the Trump administration seeks to promote access to certain U.S. AI chips in China by approved end users, while preventing IaaS providers from providing remote access to those items by end users or for end uses adverse to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The January 15 rule also demonstrates the U.S. government’s continuing focus on addressing risks related to the remote access to AI chips, amid continuing Congressional pressure to impose additional controls around such access.
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